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Abstract 
This paper analyses relevant parameters for initiating a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute on food-
related measures and thereby contributes to the question how open de facto the system is for different types of 
countries. The empirical analysis differs from existing assessments by focussing on agri-food related disputes, 
thereby allowing for a more in-depth analysis of specific country characteristics not considered in previous 
studies. The results show that some determinants such as legal capacity and monetary means are not statistically 
significant for agri-food dispute initiations. This is the case for own protectionist behavior and endured 
protectionism which lower and enlarge the probability to complain, respectively. 
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Introduction 
The dispute settlement system of the WTO was set into force by the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes as a part of the WTO Agreement of January 1, 1995. It is the 
device for the resolution of conflicts arising between members over the interpretation of their commitments 
under the regime of the organization. Dispute settlement must be self-enforcing, i.e. from the consultation to the 
potential compliance phase all actions are driven by members.  
Referred to as the “central pillar of the multilateral trading system” (WTO, 2007a)   the design of the 
WTO-dispute settlement system is often at the core of the debate on institutional reforms of the WTO and has 
also been under negotiation on the 4
th Ministerial Conference at Doha. A major desire is to make the settlement    
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system more effective and to allow for the appropriate consideration of developing countries’ demands (WTO, 
2006) . Reform proposals span a wide field from e.g. tightening time frames as regards panel proceedings and 
reestablishment of compliance, dealing more effectively with compliance and compensation procedures and 
assistance for developing countries to ensure their equality of opportunity (PETERSMANN, 2003). However, the 
understanding and knowlegde of the factors that drive the system are the preconditions to any improvement. 
In the area of food-related disputes 132 cases have been initiated in the last 11 years.
1 Regarding the 
individual country participation the figures on current and previous food-related WTO-disputes reveal that the 
majority of cases are related to the economically advanced countries. 
The following table shows the participation pattern related to development classification of the United 
Nations.
2 The group of least developed countries
3 share of the WTO membership accounts for about 21% but 
they did not use the system at all in the field of food related issues. The large group of developing countries 
initiated 44% of all food-related disputes which is similar to their participation of around 40%.  








Countries 50 24 0 74 56.06
Developing 
Countries 41 17 0 58 43.94
Least Developed 
Countries 000 0 0
Total 91 41 0 132 100














Source: Own compilation based on WTO (2007b) and UNITED NATIONS (2007)   
As the developing status at WTO-level is based on self-declaration a pattern which more precisely 
                                                 
1 These 132 cases refer to seven different Agreements. 
2 The developing status according to the WTO is based on members’ self-declaration and not on verified economic attributes. 
3 32 of currently 150 WTO members are classified as Least Developed Countries.    
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describes the economic status refers to the World Band classification of income levels
4: High and Upper Middle 
Income countries are involved in 73% of all initiated cases as both defendants and complainants. 





Income Low Income Total %-Share
High Income 48 16 1 7 72 54.55
Upper Middle 
Income 11 12 2 0 25 18.94
Lower Middle 
Income 22 7 3 0 32 24.24
Low Income 300 03 2 . 2 7
Total 84 35 6 7 132 100














Source: Own compilation based on WTO (2007b) and THE WORLD BANK (2007)   
One argument often raised to explain the limited access of the system to developing and low income 
countries is their lack of human and legal capacity (see e.g. WHALLEY, 1996). Nevertheless, in both groups, 
developed and developing countries, some members dominate and even some developing countries are rather 
active (e.g. Brazil, Philippines) indicating that potentially other paremeters may play a role. 
The subsequent question therefore is whether this pattern can be explained by underlying countries’ 
parameters and whether other than the most prominent attribute “income” may influence a dispute’s initiation. 
Compared to previous empirical studies, this investigation firstly adds an in-depth analysis of only food-related 
issues and secondly considers newly integrated potential influencing factors that may supplement the 
understanding of the dispute settlement system drives. The empirical investigation is based on a dispute 
distribution model developed and employed by HORN, MAVROIDIS AND NORDSTRÖM, 1999. 
                                                 
4 Income classification according to The World Bank (2007): Low income: $875 or less, Lower Middle Income: $876-3465, Upper 
Middle Income: $3466-10,725, High Income: >$10,726    
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The paper is organised as follows: After a literature survey on existing empirical studies focussing on the 
identified relevance of determinants, the model’s specification is developed. The following section presents 
determinants used in this agriculture-specific assessment and their expected influence. Especially the newly 
considered determinants compared to existing studies are stressed. The assessment of the initiation probabilities 
and the determinants’ relevance will be part of the next section. An evaluation of the results within the general 
context of evaluating the WTO’s accessability to different types of countries will conclude the paper. 
 
Literature review 
A few empirical assessments on the WTO initiation of disputes exist considering various determinants, 
agreements referred to, roles in a dispute (complainant, defendant, co-complainant and interested party). Table 2 
comprises the detected influences of determinants under previous investigations. In Table 3 the investigation 
period, dispute coverage, their main issue of analysis and the models used are shown.  
HORN, MAVROIDIS AND NORDSTRÖM (1999) mark the first empirical investigation by using a binomial 
dispute distribution model. As most relevant determinant factor a member’s export diversification could be 
identified. GDP did not reveal a significant influence, but a country’s legal capacity shows a slight positive 
influence on its probability to complain. BESSON AND MEHDI (2004) find empirical evidence that legal capacity 
matters with respect to a country’s likelihood to win disputes. This supports the conclusion of BUSCH AND 
REINHARDT (2003) that early settlements of developing countries, i.e. in the consultation stage or in the Panel 
stage before a ruling, are missing due to the lack of legal capacity.    
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Table 3: Survey on investigation period, dispute coverage, main issue and used model of previous empirical studies 
Empirical study
Investigation period and dispute 
coverage 
Main issue of analysis Used model
Horn et al. (1999) WTO disputes; 1995-1998; 155 
complaints; all agreements 




Holmes et al. (2003) WTO disputes; 1995-2002; 279 
complaints; all agreements
Involvement in 
complaints (both sides) 
& Success in disputes
No model - 
Descriptive statistics
Bown (2004a) GATT & WTO disputes; 1973-1998; 
174 complaints; all agreements
Determinants for 
compliance after trade 
disputes
Linear regression
Bown (2004b) GATT & WTO disputes; 1992-2003; 
complaints against U.S. trade 
remedies 
Initiation of complaints 
against U.S. trade 
remedies
Probit Model
Besson & Mehdi (2004) WTO disputes; 1995-2002; 40 
complaints of developing against 
developed countries




Bown (2005) WTO disputes; 1995-2000; 54 
complaints; complaints against 







Source: Own compilation 
The self-enforcing nature of the dispute settlement system has been the starting point for BOWN (2004a,  
2004b AND 2005): A focus lies on costs of running a dispute and a countrie’s retaliation power to finally enforce 
compliance by penalty tariffs on imports of the condemned party. BAGWELL AND STAIGER (2000) and DAM 
(1970) state that the retaliation threat always has been a central component of the GATT system. The success of 
this power is linked to the countries’ relevance as trade partner and there exists also theoretical support that the 
retaliation threat is not uniformly distributed over members and that imbalances relating to trade volume and 
market size shows influence on their force under trade disputes. BOWN (2002) demonstrates that a country’s 
capacity to influence its terms-of-trade determines the credibility of its retaliation threat and from JOHNSON 
(1953) and KENNAN AND RIEZMAN (1988) it has been revealed that larger countries perform better under tariff 
war. 
BOWN (2005) concentrated on the question whether to join complaints as co-complainant or interested party    
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and demonstrated a positive impact of the capacity to absorb legal costs on both decisions. Additionally, he 
identified a positive effect of a member’s retaliatory capacity in terms of its relevance as trading partner and a 
negative impact of countries’ dependencies on bilateral development aid. BOWN (2004c) shows that the threat of 
retaliation is significant for determining whether a government chooses to abide by its international obligations. 
BOWN (2004b) demonstrates that the successful economic resolution to disputes is influenced by the threat of 
retaliation by the plaintiff. In respect of developing countries success in disputes BESSON AND MEHDI (2004) 
discovered empirical support for the influence of their trade retaliation power. 
Market access and exporting interests are expected to be relevant for the decision on initiation or 
participation and there exists empirical substantiation for this. BOWN (2005) provides support for the positive 
impact of a country’s volume of exports at stake in its decision to attend disputes as co-complainant or 
interested third party and BOWN (2004d) demonstrates its positive influence on the likelihood to complain 
against United States (U.S.) imposed trade remedies. In the broader sense there is evidence for the relevance of 
trade volume or share respectively. HOLMES, ROLLO AND YOUNG (2003) reach the conclusion that a member’s 
trade volume determines its likelihood to file complaints on the basis of simple descriptive statistics. This 
supports the findings of HORN, MAVROIDIS AND NORDSTRÖM (1999) that trade volume and export diversity are 
closely correlated.  
BOWN (2004a) finds only limited confirmation that international obligations affect a country’s decision to 
fulfil its commitments whereas BOWN (2005) finds empirical evidence on the positive influence of a member’s 
international economic relationships – measured by its engagement in preferential trade agreements – on its 
decision to formally engage in a dispute as co-complainant or interested third party. On the topic of success in 
disputes, the results of BESSON AND MEHDI (2004) suggest that international economic relationships show 
influence on a member’s likelihood to win and they conclude that the reliance on bilateral assistance has a 
negative impact. Further, they discuss the impact of military power and find confirmation for the negative    
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influence that military powerful defendants have on the performance of developing countries in dispute.  
The following table summarizes the identified determinants and their influence of existing studies. 












Export diversity Horn et al. (1999) +
Exporting interest Bown (2005) +
Export volume Holmes et al. (2003) +
Bown (2005) +
Horn et al. (1999) 0
Bown (2004b) 0
Bown (2005) +
Besson & Mehdi (2004) -
Besson & Mehdi (2004) -
Bown (2005) -
Horn et al. (1999) +
Besson & Mehdi (2004) +
Bown (2004b) +
Besson & Mehdi (2004) +
Bown (2004d) +
Bown (2005)  +
Besson & Mehdi (2004) 0
+ positive influence; - negative influence; 0 no influence 
Retaliatory capacity
Influence on the likelihood to 










Source: Own compilation 
 
Assessing relevance of determinants: The model 
This analysis is based on the model first presented by Horn et al. (1999): The initiation decision is 
described through a binary choice model in which the member’s probability to complain against another 
member is dependent on a set of the complainant’s traits or the characteristics of its specific environment. The 
implicated conditional probability function for this binary choice situation is the Bernoulli distribution    
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where  ij y  is the binary dependent variable which takes 1 for a complaint and 0 for no complaint,   
k β denotes the vector of k  coefficients with  0 β  as absolute term, i and  j  indicate the complainant and the 
defendant respectively. The set of k  influences is merged in vector  ik X . Function  () i G ⋅  calculates the 
individual probability to complain for a prospective complainant i which can be represented by any cumulative 
probability distribution function. Here, we use the widely employed conditional logistic distribution,  



















which would result in the well-known Logit model when applied to single trials. 
The proceeding for the assessment of determinants is the reproduction of the observed sample of dispute 
initiation over the period from January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2006 based on a dispute distribution function which 
yields probabilities for positive integers, i.e. the number of a member’s initiated disputes. Given that the 
probability for a litigation decision  () i G ⋅  is constant from one trial to the next and that successive trials are 
independent, member  ' is  probability for  i c  complaints in  i n  trials against all other WTO-members is specified 
through the Binomial distribution 
(3)  ()() () ,1
i ii i







=⋅ − ⋅ ⎡⎤ ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦
⎝⎠
, 
where  ii j
j
cy =∑ . The expected number of member  ' is  complaints against all other WTO members is then 
given by the expected value of the Binomial distribution,    
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(4)  () ( ) ii E cn G =⋅ ,  
which is strictly proportional to the number of independent Bernoulli trials  i n .  
The applied method is maximum likelihood estimation. The likelihood function for the joint probability of 
observing the given sample of complaints () 12 , ,..., m cc c  is specified through 
(5)  () () () () 13 ,, . . . , 1
i ii i
mi i k k ii
ii i
n cn c
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When setting  0 k β =  excluding 0 β , thus creating the restricted model, the probability to complain reduces 
to  () i G π ⋅=  for all members i and can be determined analytically. Starting from the logarithmic likelihood 
function, 
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and searching for π  that meets the first order condition for a maximum of the log-likelihood function, i.e. 
() 1, 2
log














. Hence, for the restricted model the maximum 
likelihood estimator of the probability to start proceedings is simply the total number of observed complaints 
over the total number of bilateral export flows.  
The definition of the number of independent Bernoulli trials requires information about the exact number of 
infringements that each member faces, as the aforementioned binary choice model refers to the litigation 
decision when WTO obligations are violated. For the reason that we have no a priori information about the 
existence of inconsistent trade measures – their existence can merely be assured after a positive Dispute 
Settlement Body or Appellate Body ruling – the analysis is based on an assumption about their distribution. For    
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HORN, MAVROIDIS, AND NORDSTRÖM (1999) the number of independent Bernoulli trials is dependent on a 
country’s export diversification, i.e. its number of different exported goods over all products and trading 
partners under the regime of the WTO. Each counted bilateral export flow is assigned one trial. They worked on 
the assumption that “disputable trade measures” (DTM) are uniformly distributed over all bilateral export flows. 
The problem of this approach is that the determinants for the occurrence of disputes cannot be separately 
identified from the impacts on the existence of DTM, leading to an “export diversity bias”, i.e. an increase in 
disputes with increasing export diversity. This problem already was a central criticism of HOLMES, ROLLO AND 
YOUNG (2003).  
Following the approach of HORN, MAVROIDIS AND NORDSTRÖM (1999) we try to mitigate the problem of 
missing information about the distribution of infringements by incorporating two new indicators: Endured 
Protectionism by Trade Partner and Own Imposed Protectionism. In addition to this information on the 
likelihood of DTM in export flows, the attempt of HORN, MAVROIDIS AND NORDSTRÖM (1999) to select the 
relevant export flows is utilized with some amelioration, i.e. taking empirical values for average induced 
litigation costs into account.  
 
Determinants adressed and data used 
Against the background of the existing studies, this paper focuses specifically on agricultural and food-
related disputes in order to develop an in-depth analysis of determinants relevant in this sector and to 
additionally introduce new potential determinants. The set of determinants or countries’ traits already used in 
prior studies is reflected by agricultural trade flows characterising the export diversity, a country’s wealth and 
its legal capacity. Due to data availability on the influencing determinants under investigation the members 
sample is limited to 53, thereby maintaining the distribution of income classes.     
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Disputes data 
Restricting our analysis to agricultural and food related issues, the only precondition for the gathering of 
initiations is that products of the food sector are affected.
5 The investigation covers the period from January 1 
1995, to June 30, 2006. Each initiation is counted once to avoid double counting, thus omitting re-uptakes of 
disputes that occur when the consultation period of 12 months is exceeded. For jointly filed initiations each 
participant is assigned one dispute. When one member simultaneously requests for consultations on the same 
subject but with different defendants each one is counted by its own. Since the European Communities (EC) is a 
single customs union with a harmonised trade policy and common tariffs all disputes initiated by its members 
are assigned to the EC. On the other hand, when disputes are initiated against several EC members there is only 
one dispute assigned, including all defendants. The number of disputes is for each member related to the whole 













i y  is the time-corrected number of disputes of member i, 
o
i y  assigns member  ' is  observed disputes 
over its WTO-membership time  i t  and T  stands for the investigation period. This proceeding is self-evident, 
since the number of filed disputes ought to be linked to a member’s membership time in the WTO. By this 
means the time-bias is outweighed.  
Export diversity 
We adopt the model first presented by HORN,  MAVROIDIS AND NORDSTRÖM (1999). Strictly speaking 
export diversification is not an explanatory variable but is an intrinsic component of the underlying binomial 
                                                 
5 Agricultural and food related issues comprise initiated disputes which were raised under the following agreements: Agreement on 
Agriculture, Agreement on Safeguards, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, Anti-Dumping-Agreement and the Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures.    
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dispute distribution model. They empirically supported the dependency of a member’s activity as complainant 
from its export diversity, i.e. its number of different exported goods over all trading partners. The underlying 
principle lies in the expectation of an increased probability to encounter infringements if a member’s export 
diversity increases. This is self-evident if we assume infringements to be uniformly distributed over all markets, 
products and trading partners. Hence, we expect the number of disputes to be positively related to members’ 
amount of different bilateral export flows. The export diversification factor’s explanation content is just 
confirmable by excluding all other variables. Export flows come from EUROCARE (2006) available on an 
aggregation level comparable to the HS
6-4-level.  
Induced costs of litigation 
HORN,  MAVROIDIS AND NORDSTRÖM (1999) were the first analysing the litigation costs involved and 
demonstrated their relevance. Their approach is followed through the implementation of a threshold for 
counting a member’s bilateral export flows, thus excluding flows under a certain value not being worth to fight 
for. According to calculations of NORDSTRÖM (2005), average costs for dispute settlement proceedings range 
from $128,500 to $706,000, dependent on the degree of its complexity and the per hour rate of engaged 
lawyers. Hence, the analysis is conducted for four different litigation cost levels, i.e. excluding all flows below 
the respective threshold: $0 when no threshold is applied, $300K for low costs, $500K for medium costs and 
$700K for high litigation costs. The impact of the adopted cost-thresholds is shown for the restricted model, i.e. 
to the exclusion of all explanatory variables, thus comparing different cost thresholds with respect to the 
corresponding model’s prediction quality. 
Endured protectionism by trade partner 
This is to our knowledge the first empirical effort to incorporate information about the distribution of 
                                                 
6 Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System of the World Customs Organization (WCO)    
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WTO-inconsistent trade barriers to reduce the lack of information about the existence of actual infringements 
which is the precondition to each dispute. It is assumed that the more protective the trade policy of a country’s 
trading partners is, the higher the probability that it faces disputable trade barriers. Hence, we expect the number 
of initiated disputes to be positively related to a country’s faced trade restrictiveness. For this purpose the 
Market Access Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (MA-OTRI) provided by KEE, NICITA AND OLARREAGA 
(2006) is used. It compromises a tariff equivalent of all barriers that exporters of the respective country face on 
average.    
Own protectionist behaviour 
Another hypothesis is that a country’s tendency towards protectionism is negatively related to the number 
of its filed disputes. The rationale behind this is the assumption that a more protective member faces also a 
greater likelihood to become “victim” of an accusation. We presume a more protective country to pursue a 
defensive and peaceful strategy to not provoke to be challenged itself. On the other hand we hypothesize that 
more protective countries have a lower propensity to fight for market liberalisation. For this purpose the Overall 
Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) by KEE,  NICITA AND OLARREAGA (2006) is used as a measure for a 
country’s inclination to restrictive policies. It is a tariff equivalent for all trade barriers which the respective 
country imposes in average upon the rest of the world. Consequently, it provides the mirror image of the 
aforementioned MAOTRI indicator, measuring the trade restrictiveness from the potential complainant’s 
perspective. 
Relevance of the agricultural sector 
Independent from a country’s contact to a trading partner we expect the overall importance of the 
agricultural sector as having a positive influence on initiating a case: the higher the overall economic relevance, 
the more sensitive a country may be regarding violations. To quantify the sector’s importance the agricultural    
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share of a member’s GDP is employed. This rather crude indicator is used due to missing data on the value of 
the countries’ food industry. An improved measure should comprise information on the relevance of a 
member’s whole agri-food sector. The data is drawn from the UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT (2003).  
Capacity to absorb legal costs/wealth 
The capacity to absorb legal costs is supposed to be essential for the accomplishment of disputes as explicit 
compensation for litigation costs is not intended by the system. Even though the expected gains from removing 
the trade barrier exceed the induced litigation costs, this potential payoff lies ahead and is uncertain. For this 
reason each potential plaintiff must anticipate substantial costs that are involved by prosecution and in case of 
need, enforcement of compliance. It is assumed that the number of complaints is positively related to a 
member’s capacity to absorb legal costs. As proxy for such financial means we use a country’s GDP, provided 
by the UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (2002 AND 2003). 
Legal capacity 
HORN, MAVROIDIS AND NORDSTRÖM (1999) found empirical evidence on the matter of a country’s legal 
capacity in respect of initiating disputes. We hypothesise that the larger a country’s endowment with skilled 
legal personnel, the higher its capability to challenge arguable trade measures of its trading partners and we 
expect the number of bilateral complaints to be positively linked. The respective determinant should comprise 
the whole extent of a country’s trade administration, i.e. its budget, its staff’s size and quality. Since there is no 
differentiated information on members’ legal capability we use like HORN, MAVROIDIS AND NORDSTRÖM (1999) 
their delegation size at Geneva as proxy. The respective information comes from the UNITED NATIONS (2004).  
Influence of private actors and governmental efficiency  
The influence of private pressure groups on the government is relevant as only the government may finally    
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enter a dispute. This power may differ among countries depending on the national framework for organizing 
private lobby activities and on their respective relevance. It is increasingly seen as especially relevant for 
developing countries in determining the use of the settlement system (SHAFFER, 2003; BOWN AND HOEKMAN, 
2005). 
SHAFFER (2003a) and SHAFFER (2003b) demonstrate the relevance of private-public partnerships for the 
initiation and prosecution of trade disputes at the WTO and BESSON AND MEHDI (2004) argue that domestic 
variables should be incorporated to handle the potential distortion sources of the dispute settlement procedure.  
This is to our knowledge the first empirical attempt to capture some aspects of the aforementioned 
interaction between the public and the private sector regarding dispute initiation. For this purpose two domestic 
variables are included which are provided by KAUFMANN (2004): (i) the Corporate Legal Corruption 
Component (CLCC), measuring legal dimensions of undue political influence by the private sector and (ii) the 
Judicial/Legal Effectiveness Integrity Index (JLEI), assessing the effectiveness and integrity of the legal and 
judicial system. The greater the influence of lobbyists, e.g. by legal political finance or by the voice of interests 
of powerful firms, the more successful the private sector is supposed to be in achieving its export interests. 
Accordingly, the number of challenged disputes should be positively correlated to the amount of undue 
influence, aggregated in the CLCC variable. It is hypothesized, that the higher the efficiency and integrity of the 
legal and judicial system of a country, the higher its ability to identify illegal trade measures and to pursue a 
legal action. Hence, the probability for litigation is presumed to be positively dependent on the JLEI variable.  
Membership time 
The time of membership can express learning costs in terms of decreasing additional costs for running an 
additional dispute. Hence, we suspect a member’s experience through its membership in the WTO to be 
positively related to its number of filed disputes. An index is created over the time since the inception of the    
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organization until 30 June 2006, thus relating each member’s membership time to the whole observation period. 
The associated data is from WTO (2007c).  
The following table provides a survey on all explanatory variables with their respective data and source and 
their predicted impact on the initiation of disputes.  
Table 5: Survey on Explanatory Variables, Data and Predicted Sign 
Explanatory variables Data Source
Predicted 
sign
Export Diversity* Census of different export flows on 
HS-4 level
EuroCARE (2006) (+)
Capacity to Absorb Legal 
Costs/Wealth*
Per capita Gross Domestic Product UNCTAD - Statistical Yearbook (2001, 
2003)
+
Legal Capacity* Size of permanent delegation at 
Geneva
United Nations (2004) +
Influence of Private Actors Measure of  legal dimensions of 
undue political influence by the 
private sector
Kaufmann (2004): Corporate Legal 
Corruption Component (CLCC)
+
Governmental Efficiency Measure of effectiveness and 
integrity of the legal and judicial 
system 
Kaufmann (2004): Legal and Judicial 
Effectiveness and Integrity Index (LJE)
+
Relevance of the Agricultural 
Sector
Percentage share of GDP produced 
in agriculture
UNCTAD - Statistical Yearbook (2001, 
2003)
+
Endured Protectionism by 
Trade Partner
Average endured tariff equivalent Kee, Nicita, Olarreaga (2006): Overall 
Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI)
+
Own Imposed Protectionism Average imposed tariff equivalent Kee, Nicita, Olarreaga (2006): Market 
Access Overall Trade Restrictiveness 
Index (MA-OTRI)
_
WTO Membership Time Index basing on a members 
percentage membership share from 
1. January 1995 to 30 June 2006
World Trade Organization (2006) +
 
* Influencing factors already integrated in previous empirical investigations 
Source: Own compilation 
 
Results: Probabilities and relevance of determinats 
For the restricted model the probability to complain is identical for all members and its estimate only 
dependent on the number of all observed disputes and of the sum of bilateral export flows between all trading    
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partners. Hence, improved model behaviour is merely owing to changes in the distribution of export flows over 
members by weighing the relevant exports flows, i.e. introducing thresholds for accounting only export flows 
beyond a certain value. The average number of export flows declines from 5530 in case of no threshold to 65 
when the highest threshold of $700,000 is used. The fit of the model is measured by two different indicators: the 
fraction of predicted members that lie inside a 25%-interval around their respective observed value and the 
mean sum of absolute deviations (MSAD) between observed and predicted disputes 
(8)  l 1
ii i MSAD c c
m
=− ∑ , 
where  i c  denotes the number of observed and  l
i c  the number of predicted disputes of member i and 
massigns the sample size.  
Both indicators prove that the weighing of export flows by employing thresholds is essential for the 
amendment of the model, i.e. the raise of the threshold increases the fit of the model. This result supports the 
findings of HORN, MAVROIDIS AND NORDSTRÖM (1999) who already identified weighted export flows as the 
most relevant determinant for explaining dispute initiations. Table 6 comprises the results for the restricted 
model. The threshold of $300,000 is omitted as it has no substantial influences on the results compared to no 
threshold. For the middle cost threshold of $500,000 the MSAD decreases by 23% to 1.34 compared to 1.75 for 
the model without threshold whereas the fraction of predicted members inside the 25%-bound increases from 
45% to 57%. When the highest threshold is applied, the MSAD decreases further by 28% to 0.96 while the 
fraction of well predicted members slightly increases to 60%.     
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Table 6: Results for the restricted model subject to different thresholds for export flows 
Threshold   $0
BETA 0 -8.0133 min max  avg
PROB 0.0003 127 115000 5530
1.75
45%
Threshold   $500000
BETA 0 -5.2604 min max  avg
PROB 0.0052 16 6210 354
1.34
57%
Threshold   $700000
BETA 0 -3.5336 min max  avg
PROB 0.0284 1 750 65
0.96
60%
Number of bilateral export flows 
Mean sum of absolute deviations
Fraction inside of  25% bound
Number of bilateral export flows 
Mean sum of absolute deviations
Fraction inside of  25% bound
Number of bilateral export flows 
Mean sum of absolute deviations
Fraction inside of  25% bound
 
Source: Own compilation. 
For the unrestricted model the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria are utilized to select the relevant 
indicators. Based on Akaike and Schwarz information criteria the incorporation of additional variables is traded 
off against the increased fit of the model. By incorporating additional explanatory variables the goodness of fit 
is improved regardless of the number of free parameters in the data generating process. Both indicators penalize 
increasing complexity thus mitigating the danger of over-fitting. It is then sought after the model specification 
showing the lowest information criterion value. The proceeding is stepwise: After including one additional 
variable, the resulting model is estimated and the related information value is calculated. In the next step the 
variable that yielded the lowest information value is retained and the remaining variables are assessed based on 
the resulting information value. Additional variables are included as long as they reduce the information 
criteria. Subsequently, their joint significant influence is validated by test statistics that are based on bootstrap 
methods, thereby generating each coefficient’s empirical distribution.
7  
According to this proceeding only three variables achieve an improvement of the model: (1) Endured 
                                                 
7 Estimation, selection of variables and the bootstrap re-sampling and testing procedure are implemented in GAMS (General Algebraic 
Modeling System). The standard errors of the coefficients are calculated for 2000 re-sampling iterations.      
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Protectionism, (2) Own Imposed Protectionism and (3) WTO Membership Time result in a sufficient increase in 
the goodness of fit for no threshold and the two thresholds $300,000 and $500,000. The remaining variables are 
discarded as they raise the model’s complexity more than its fit. Table 7 comprises the results for the 
unrestricted model and $500,000 threshold. All included variables show the hypothesized sign and their 
influence is proved to be significantly different from zero. Compared to the restricted model, the fraction of 
predicted members inside the 25%-bound remains unchanged. Nonetheless, the sum of absolute deviations 
between observed and predicted complaints decreases. This is due to improved model behaviour for members 
with a large number of observed disputes, predominantly for the EC and the U.S.  
























PROB min PROB max PROB avg
Fractions inside of 25% 
bound 57% 0.0001 0.0137 0.0050
*  statistically different from 0 at the 1% level





Number of bilateral export flows 
Mean sum of absolute 
deviations 0.81
Probability to complain per export flow
 
Source: Own compilation. 
The probability to complain covers an interval from 0.0001 to 0.0137. A member’s activity in dispute 
initiation cannot be inferred from its probability to complain without considering the number of its export flows: 
Being one of the two most active users of the system, the probability to complain of the EC falls into the lower    
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third whereas the probability of Australia, Canada and the U.S. belong to the highest. For the $500,000 
threshold the probability of the U.S. constitutes over three times the EC’s probability. Corresponding to their 
reciprocal ratio with respect to their bilateral export flows (1 : 2.25) this results in 25 predicted disputes for the 
U.S. (but 26 actually observed) and 17 for the EC (only 14 actually observed). 
  The application of the highest threshold of $700,000 for the three variables results in a further 
improvement as regards the MSAD, which falls to 0.68 and the fraction of well predicted members, which rises 
to 64%. Simultaneously, the significant influence of the variable “Endured Protectionism” disappears. 
According to Akaike and Schwarz criteria this variable would be discarded under the highest threshold. Its 
coefficient diminishes to -0.84 with a standard deviation of 0.96. The significant influence of the remaining 
variables remains virtually unchanged. 
The findings of HORN, MAVROIDIS AND NORDSTRÖM (1999) on legal capacity as relevant could not be 
supported in our analysis of food related disputes. This can be explained by the fact that legal capacity is an 
internationally tradable good such that each member can purchase legal expertise, provided that it has sufficient 
financial resources. Hence, legal capacity must not necessarily be stocked by a member in order to get access to 
it. Contrariwise, this result may be based on a poor proxy, since a better indicator should incorporate all 
essential aspects of a member’s trade administration, comprising its budget, the size and professional skill of its 
staff and its administrative efficiency. The findings of BOWN (2005) in respect of the influence of monetary 
means, is not confirmed by our results either. 
It could be shown that the lack of information on the distribution of infringements is mitigated by 
incorporating the variables Imposed Protectionism and Endured Protectionism.  
Operating experience seems to be relevant for a member’s activity as shown by the significant influence of 
the variable WTO Membership Time, however experience gained from the overall GATT-membership prior to    
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1995 and from other international trade agreements are not considered. 
The indicators on Governmental Efficiency, Influence of Private Actors and Relevance of the Agricultural 
Sector do not improve the model’s explanatory power as they are all discarded according to Akaike and 
Schwarz criteria. In case of the latter one this could be due to its lacking information content, since it refers only 
to the agricultural sectors relevance. Actually, a measure for the relevance of a member’s whole agri-food-
industry is needed.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper presented an analysis of the determinants for initiating WTO disputes related to the agri-food 
sector. Apart from this new sectoral focus, the analysis extended the literature with a more in-depth analysis of 
potentially relevant determinants. The empirical model which represented the number of initiated disputes by a 
country as a sequence of Bernoulli trials with probabilities modelled by a logistic distribution was applied to 53 
WTO member countries. 
The results show that some of the determinants relevant in previous dispute studies such as legal capacity 
and monetary means could not be confirmed as statistically relevant in the context of the agri-food sector. 
Mitigating some shortcomings of earlier analysis, it could be shown that increasing own protectionist attitude 
lowered the probability to complain and the level of protection faced by a country lead to an increase. Both 
variables can be seen as highly relevant especially in the agri-food sector. At the same time, the duration of 
WTO membership time clearly contributed to a larger likelihood to initiate a WTO dispute. Further research 
should focus on the improvement of data quality as well as approaches which allow to simultaneously 
incorporating characteristics of the defendant country.     
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